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Abstract
We study the inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) problem under the transition
dynamics mismatch between the expert and the learner. In particular, we consider
the Maximum Causal Entropy (MCE) IRL learner model and provide an upper
bound on the learner’s performance degradation based on the `1-distance between
the two transition dynamics of the expert and the learner. Then, by leveraging
insights from the Robust RL literature, we propose a robust MCE IRL algorithm,
which is a principled approach to help with this mismatch issue. Finally, we
empirically demonstrate the stable performance of our algorithm compared to the
standard MCE IRL algorithm under transition mismatches in finite MDP problems.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in Reinforcement Learning (RL) [1, 2, 3, 4] have demonstrated impressive perfor-
mance in games [5, 6], continuous control [7], and robotics [8]. Despite these successes, a broader
application of RL in real-world domains is hindered by the difficulty of designing a proper reward
function. Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) addresses this issue by inferring a reward function
from a given set of demonstrations of the desired behavior [9, 10]. IRL has been extensively studied,
and many algorithms have already been proposed [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
Virtually all IRL algorithms rely on the assumption that the expert demonstrations are collected
from the same environment, where the IRL agent is trained. However, this assumption rarely holds
in real-world; There is often a mismatch between the learner and the expert’s transition dynamics,
resulting in poor performance that are critical in healthcare [17] or autonomous driving [18]. Indeed,
the performance degradation of an IRL agent due to transition dynamics mismatch has already been
noted empirically [19, 20, 21, 22], but none of these works provide theoretical guidance on this issue.
To this end, our work first provides a theoretical study on the effect of such mismatches in the context
of the infinite horizon Maximum Causal Entropy (MCE) IRL framework [23, 24, 25]. Specifically,
we bound the potential decrease in the IRL learner’s performance as a function of `1-distance between
the expert and the learner’s transition dynamics. We then propose a robust variant of the MCE IRL
algorithm to recover the reward function under the transition dynamics mismatch effectively.
There is precedence to our robust IRL approach, such as [26] that employs an adversarial training
method to learn a robust policy against adversarial changes in the learner’s environment. We
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incorporate this idea within our IRL context, by viewing the expert’s transition dynamics as a
perturbed version of the learner’s one, and systematically develop our robust MCE IRL algorithm.
Our robust MCE IRL algorithm also leverages techniques from the robust RL literature [27, 28, 29, 26].
Few recent works [19, 20, 30] attempt to infer the expert’s transition dynamics from the demonstration
set or via additional information, and then apply the standard IRL method to recover the reward
function based on the learned dynamics. Still, the transition dynamics can be estimated only to a
certain accuracy level, i.e., we still have a mismatch between the learner’s belief and the dynamics of
the expert’s environment. Our robust IRL approach can be incorporated into this research vein to
improve the IRL agent’s performance further. In particular, our main contributions are the following:
1. We provide an upper bound for the suboptimality of an IRL learner that receives expert
demonstrations from an MDP with different transition dynamics, with respect to (w.r.t.) the
one that receives demonstrations from an MDP with the same transition dynamics of the
learner environment (cf., Section 3).
2. We find suitable conditions under which a solution to the MCE IRL with a model mismatch
optimization problem exists (cf., Section 3.1).
3. We propose a robust variant of the MCE IRL algorithm to learn a policy from expert
demonstrations under transition dynamics mismatch (cf., Section 4).
4. We demonstrate our method’s robust performance compared to the standard MCE IRL in a
broad set of experiments under both linear and non-linear reward settings (cf., Section 5).
2 Problem Setup
This section formalizes the robust IRL problem. We use bold notation to represent vectors.
Environment and Reward: We formally represent the environment by a Markov decision process
(MDP) Mθ := {S,A, T, γ, P0, Rθ}, parameterized by θ ∈ Rd. The state and action spaces are
denoted as S and A, respectively. We assume that |S| , |A| <∞. T : S × S ×A → [0, 1] represents
the transition dynamics, i.e., T (s′|s, a) is the probability of transitioning to state s′ by taking action a
from state s. The discount factor is given by γ ∈ (0, 1), and P0 is the initial state distribution. We
consider a linear reward function Rθ : S → R of the form Rθ(s) = 〈θ,φ(s)〉, where θ ∈ Rd is the
reward parameter, and φ : S → Rd is a feature map.
We use one-hot feature map φ : S → {0, 1}|S|, where the sth element of φ (s) is 1 and 0 elsewhere.
Our results can be extended to any general feature map, but we use this particular choice as a running
example for concreteness. We focus on state-only reward function since the state-action reward
function is not that useful in the robustness context.
We denote an MDP without a reward function by M = Mθ\Rθ = {S,A, T, γ, P0}.
Policy and Performance: A policy pi : S × A → [0, 1] is a mapping from a state to a prob-
ability distribution over actions. The set of all valid stochastic policies is denoted by Π :=
{pi : ∑a pi(a|s) = 1, ∀s ∈ S; pi(a|s) ≥ 0, ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A}.
We are interested in two different performance measures of any policy pi acting in the MDP Mθ: (i)
The total expected return V piMθ := E [
∑∞
t=0 γ
tRθ (st) | pi,M ], and (ii) its entropy regularized variant
V pi,softMθ := E [
∑∞
t=0 γ
t {Rθ (st)− log pi (at|st)} | pi,M ].
The state occupancy measure of a policy pi in the MDP M is defined as ρpiM (s) :=
(1− γ)∑∞t=0 γtP [St = s | pi,M ], where P [St = s | pi,M ] denotes the probability of visiting the
state s after t steps by following the policy pi in M . Note that ρpiM (s) does not depend on the reward
function. Let ρpiM ∈ R|S| be a vector whose sth element is ρpiM (s). For the one-hot feature map φ, we
have that V piMθ =
1
1−γ
∑
s ρ
pi
M (s)Rθ(s) =
1
1−γ 〈θ,ρpiM 〉.
A policy pi is optimal for the MDP Mθ if pi ∈ arg maxpi′ V pi
′
Mθ
, and we denote an optimal pol-
icy by pi∗Mθ . Similarly, the soft-optimal policy (always unique) in Mθ is defined as pi
soft
Mθ
:=
arg maxpi′ V
pi′,soft
Mθ
(cf., Appendix B for a parametric form of this policy).
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Figure 1: An illustration of the IRL problem under transition dynamics mismatch: See Section 2.
Learner and Expert: In our setting, we have two entities. A learner implementing the MCE
IRL algorithm, and an expert. We consider two MDPs MLθ =
{S,A, TL, γ, P0, Rθ} and MEθ ={S,A, TE , γ, P0, Rθ} that differ only in the transition dynamics.
The true reward parameter θ = θ∗ is known only to the expert. The expert provides demonstrations
to the learner: (i) By following policy pisoft
ME
θ∗
in ME when there is a transition dynamics mismatch
between the learner and the expert, or (ii) by following policy pisoft
ML
θ∗
in ML otherwise. Note that,
similar to [19], we consider a soft-optimal policy for the expert. The learner always operates in the
MDPML and is not aware of the true reward parameter, i.e., it only has access toMLθ∗\Rθ∗ . It learns
a reward parameter θ and the corresponding soft-optimal policy pisoft
MLθ
, based on the state occupancy
measure ρ it received from the expert. Here, ρ is either ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
or ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ML
depending on the case. Our
results can be extended to estimate ρ via Monte Carlo samples using concentration inequalities [11].
Our learner model builds on the MCE IRL framework that matches the expert’s state occupancy
measure ρ. In particular, the learner policy is obtained via solving the following problem:
arg max
pi∈Π
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pi(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pi,ML
]
(1)
subject to ρ = ρpiML (2)
Note that this optimization problem only requires access to MLθ \Rθ . The constraint (2) follows from
our choice of one-hot feature map. We denote the optimal solution of the above problem by pisoft
MLθ
with a corresponding reward parameter: (i) θ = θE , when we use ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
as ρ, or (ii) θ = θL, when
we use ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ML
as ρ. Here, the parameters θE and θL are obtained by solving the corresponding dual
problems of (1)-(2). Finally, we are interested in the performance of the learner policy pisoft
MLθ
in the
MDP MLθ∗ . Our problem setup is illustrated in Figure 1.
3 MCE IRL under Transition Dynamics Mismatch
This section provides a bound on the MCE IRL learner’s suboptimality when there is a transition
dynamics mismatch between the expert and the learner, as compared to an ideal learner without this
mismatch. On the expert side, the following theorem bounds the performance difference between the
soft-optimal policies of the two different MDPs MEθ∗ and M
L
θ∗ defined in Section 2:
Theorem 1. Consider the two MDPs MEθ∗ and M
L
θ∗ (cf., Section 2) that differ only in the transition
dynamics. Let pisoft
ME
θ∗
and pisoft
ML
θ∗
be the soft optimal policies for MEθ∗ and M
L
θ∗ respectively. Assume
that the true reward function is bounded, i.e., Rθ∗ (s) ∈ [Rmin, Rmax] ,∀s ∈ S. Then, the state
occupancy measures induced by the policies pisoft
ME
θ∗
and pisoft
ML
θ∗
on the MDP ME satisfy the following:∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ME
θ∗
ME
− ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 4 · C
(1− γ)2 ·maxs,a
√
‖TE (· | s, a)− TL (· | s, a)‖1,
3
where C =
√
γ ·max {Rmax + log |A| ,− log |A| −Rmin}. Further, the performance gap between
the two policies pisoft
ME
θ∗
and pisoft
ML
θ∗
on the MDP MEθ∗ is bounded as follows:∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ME
θ∗
ME
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4 · C ·Rabsmax(1− γ)3 ·maxs,a
√
‖TE (· | s, a)− TL (· | s, a)‖1,
where Rabsmax = max {|Rmin| , |Rmax|}.
We now turn to our objective. Consider the learner (soft-max) policies obtained as the solutions to
the optimization problem (1)-(2):
1. pisoft
MLθE
, when there is a transition dynamics mismatch between the learner and expert,
2. pisoft
MLθL
, when both the learner and expert environments are the same.
The following theorem bounds the performance degradation of policy pisoft
MLθE
as compared to the
policy pisoft
MLθL
in the MDP MLθ∗ , where the learner operates on:
Theorem 2. The performance gap between policies pisoft
MLθE
and pisoft
MLθL
on the MDP MLθ∗ is given by∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θL
ML
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4 · C ·Rabsmax(1− γ)3 ·maxs,a
√
‖TL (· | s, a)− TE (· | s, a)‖1
+
γ ·Rabsmax
(1− γ)2 ·maxs,a
∥∥TL (· | s, a)− TE (· | s, a)∥∥
1
,
where C and Rabsmax are defined as in Theorem 1.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are in Appendix C.
3.1 Existence of Solution under Transition Dynamics Mismatch
The proof of the existence of a unique solution to the optimization problem (1)-(2), presented in [31],
relies on the fact that both expert and learner environments are the same. This assumption implies
that the expert policy is in the feasible set that is consequently non-empty. The following theorem
poses a condition under which we can ensure that the feasible set is not empty when expert and
learner environments are not the same.
Theorem 3. Consider the matrix T defined as follows. In the first |S| rows, the entry in the sth
row and (s′ |A|+ a′)th column is the element ρ(s′)TL(s|s′, a′). In the last |S| rows, the entries
are instead given by 1 from position s′ |A| to position s′ |A| + |A|. Then, the feasible set of the
optimization problem (1)-(2) is not empty when T is full rank.
Proof of Theorem 3 is in Appendix C.4.2. This result allows us to develop a robust MCE IRL scheme
in the next section by ensuring the absence of duality gap.
4 Robust MCE IRL via Two-Player Markov Game
This section focuses on recovering a learner (soft-max) policy via MCE IRL framework in a robust
manner, under transition dynamics mismatch, i.e., ρ = ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
in Eq. (2). In particular, our learner
policy matches the expert state occupancy measure ρ under the most adversarial transition dynamics
belonging to a set described as follows for a given α > 0:
T L,α = {αTL + (1− α)T¯ , ∀T¯ ∈ ∆S|S,A} , (3)
where ∆S|S,A is the set of all the possible transition dynamics T : S × S ×A → [0, 1].
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Note that the transition dynamics in the set T L,α are perturbed variants of TL. Then, we define a
corresponding class of MDPs as follows:
ML,α = {{S,A, TL,α, γ, P0} , ∀TL,α ∈ T L,α} .
In the following, we systematically derive a robust variant of MCE IRL given in Algorithm 1 2.
We start by formulating the IRL problem for any MDP ML,α ∈ ML,α, with transition dynamics
TL,α = αTL + (1− α)T¯ ∈ T L,α, as follows:
arg max
pipl∈Π
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pipl(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pipl,ML,α
]
(4)
subject to ρ = ρpi
pl
ML,α (5)
If Theorem 3 holds, the feasible set is not empty, and the problem can be relaxed without duality gap:
arg max
pipl∈Π
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pipl(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pipl,ML,α
]
+ θ>
(
ρpi
pl
ML,α − ρ
)
(6)
For any fixed θ ∈ R|S| the problem (6) is feasible since Π is a closed and bounded set.
We define U(θ) as the value of the program (6) for a given θ. By weak duality, U(θ) provides an
upper bound on the optimization problem (4)-(5). Consequently, we introduce the dual problem
aiming to find the value of θ corresponding to the lowest upper bound, which can be written as
min
θ
U(θ) := max
pipl∈Π
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pipl(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pipl,ML,α
]
+ θ>
(
ρpi
pl
ML,α − ρ
)
. (7)
We then define pipl,∗ as follows
pipl,∗ ∈ arg max
pipl∈Π
θ>ρpi
pl
ML,α + E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pipl(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pipl,ML,α
]
.
One can compute the gradient3 ∇θU = ρpipl,∗ML,α − ρ, and thus update the parameter simply as
θ ← θ −∇U or with a more sophisticated optimization scheme. According to [32, Theorem 1], the
policy pipl,∗ exists and it is unique. If Theorem 3 holds, then the problem can be relaxed without
duality gap according to [31, Lemma 2].
Based on these observations, we propose to maximize the primal objective in the MDP ML,α,θ ∈
ML,α that minimizes the entropy regularized total expected return of the player with respect to the
parameter θ, i.e., ML,α,θ ∈ arg minM∈ML,α θ>ρpi
pl
M + E
[∑∞
t=0−γt log pipl(at|st) | pipl,M
]
.4
To this end, we need to solve the following problem:
arg max
pipl∈Π
min
M∈ML,α
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pipl(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pipl,M
]
+ θ>ρpi
pl
M , (8)
where the term depending ρ has been neglected since it is not affected by the variables of the
optimization problem. We can express the entropy term in the above problem as follows:
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pipl(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pipl,M
]
=
∑
s∈S
ρpi
pl
M (s)
∑
a∈A
{−pipl(a|s) log pipl(a|s)}
=
∑
s∈S
ρpi
pl
M (s)H
pipl (A | S = s)
2The gradient ραpi
pl+(1−α)piop
ML
− ρ is equivalent to ρpiplML,α,θ − ρ.
3We have verified in Appendix D that the same update arises as gradient of the worst-case predictive log-loss
modified to take into account the transition dynamics mismatch.
4Note that as the parameter θ is updated, the worst case environment also changes. As long as the environment
ML,α,θ satisfies the requirement of Theorem 3, our procedure holds.
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=
(
Hpi
pl
)>
ρpi
pl
M ,
whereHpi
pl ∈ R|S| a vector whose sth element is the entropy of the player policy given the state s.
Since the quantityHpi
pl
+ θ depends only on the states, to solve the problem (8), we can utilize the
equivalence between the robust MDP [27, 28] formulation and the action-robust MDP [29, 26, 33]
formulation shown in [26]. We can interpret the minimization over the environment class as the
minimization over a set of opponent policies that with probability 1− α take control of the agent and
perform the worst possible move from the current agent state. Indeed, interpreting
(
Hpi
pl
+ θ
)>
ρpi
pl
M
as an entropy regularized value function, i.e., θ as a reward parameter, we can write:
min
M∈ML,α
(
Hpi
pl
+ θ
)>
ρpi
pl
M
= min
T¯
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
{
Rθ(st) +H
pipl (A | S = st)
} ∣∣∣∣ pipl, P0, αTL + (1− α)T¯
]
= min
piop∈Π
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
{
Rθ(st) +H
pipl (A | S = st)
} ∣∣∣∣ αpipl + (1− α)piop,ML
]
. (9)
Finally, we can formulate the problem (9) as a two-player zero-sum Markov game [26] with transition
dynamics given by
T two,L,α(s′|s, apl, aop) = αTL(s′|s, apl) + (1− α)TL(s′|s, aop),
where apl is an action chosen according to the player policy and aop according to the opponent policy.
Note that the opponent is restricted to take the worst possible action from the state of the player, i.e.,
there is no additional state variable for the opponent. As a result, we reach a two-player Markov
game with a regularization term for the player as follows:
arg max
pipl∈Π
min
piop∈Π
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
{
Rθ(st) +H
pipl (A | S = st)
} ∣∣∣∣ pipl, piop,M two,L,α
]
, (10)
where M two,L,α =
{S,A,A, T two,L,α, γ, P0, Rθ} is the two-player MDP associated with the above
game. The repetition of the action space A denotes the fact that player and adversary share the same
action space. We propose a dynamic programming approach to find player and opponent policies (cf.,
Algorithm 2). Theoretical support (inspired from [34]) for the Algorithm 2 is provided in Appendix E.
Algorithm 1 Robust MCE IRL via Markov Game
Initialize: Player policy pipl, opponent strength α, opponent policy piop, parameter θ
while not converged do
Compute ραpi
pl+(1−α)piop
ML
by dynamic programming (cf., [31, Section V.C]).
Update θ with Adam [35] using the gradient
(
ρ
αpipl+(1−α)piop
ML
− ρ
)
.
Use Algorithm 2 with R = Rθ to update pipl and piop s.t. they solve the problem (10).
end while
5 Experiments
This section demonstrates the superior performance due our robust method as compared to the
standard MCE IRL algorithm, when there is a transition dynamics mismatch between the expert and
the learner. We also assess the effect of the parameter choices α.
Setup: We consider a reference MDP M refθ∗ =
(S,A, T ref , γ, P0, Rθ∗) with deterministic tran-
sition dynamics T ref . Further, given a learner noise L ∈ [0, 1], we introduce a learner MDP
without reward function as ML,L =
(S,A, TL,L , γ, P0) where TL,L ∈ ∆S|S,A is defined as
TL,L := (1− L)T ref + LT¯ with T¯ ∈ ∆S|S,A.
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Algorithm 2 Value Iteration for Two-Player Markov Game
Initialize: Q(s, apl, aop)← 0, V (s)← 0
while not converged do
for s ∈ S do
for (apl, aop) ∈ A×A do
Q(s, apl, aop) = R(s) + γ
∑
s′
T two,L,α(s′|s, apl, aop)V (s′) (11)
end for
V (s) = log
∑
apl
exp
(
min
aop
Q(s, apl, aop)
)
(12)
end for
end while
Compute the marginal Q values for player and opponent, for all (s, apl, aop) ∈ S ×A×A:
Qpl(s, apl) = min
aop
Q(s, apl, aop) and Qop(s, aop) = log
∑
apl
expQ(s, apl, aop) (13)
Compute the player (soft-max) and opponent (greedy) policies, for all (s, apl, aop) ∈ S ×A×A:
pipl(apl|s) = expQ
pl(s, apl)∑
a′ Q
pl(s, a′)
and piop(aop|s) = 1
[
aop ∈ arg min
a′
Qop(s, a′)
]
Output: pipl and piop
Similarly, given an expert noise E ∈ [0, 1], we define an expert MDP ME,Eθ∗ =(S,A, TE,E , γ, P0, Rθ∗) where TE,E ∈ ∆S|S,A is defined as TE,E := (1 − E)T ref + E T¯
with T¯ ∈ ∆S|S,A. Notice that fixing a pair (E , L) defines a precise IRL problem with model
mismatch where the expert acts in ME,E
θ∗ and the learner in M
L,L . For each fixed noise pairs
(E , L), we apply our approach with different values for α, whereby obtaining a different policy
for each tuple (E , L, α). We finally evaluate the total expected return of each of these recovered
policies in ML,L
θ∗ , i.e., M
L,L endowed with the true reward function Rθ∗ for each value of α.
Environments: We study the classical environments Gridworld and Objectworld, whose reward
functions are linear and non-linear, respectively. Both of them areN×N grid, where a cell represents
a state, with four actions per state, corresponding to steps in one of the four cardinal directions.
Gridworld has a linear reward represented by a weight vector with entries corresponding to each
state, as shown in Figure 2a. Introduced by [36], Objectworld is a gridworld with non-linear reward
determined by the distance of the agent to the objects that are randomly placed in the environment.
Each object has an outer and an inner color; however, only the former plays a role in determining the
reward while the latter serves as a distractor. The reward is −2 in positions within three cells to an
outer blue object (black areas of Figure 2e), 0 if they are also within two cells from an outer green
object (white areas), and −1 otherwise (gray areas).
To accommodate the infinite horizon setting in MCE IRL, we shift the rewards originally proposed
by [36] to non-positive values, and we randomly placed the goal state in a white area. We also modify
the reward features originally proposed in [36] by augmenting them with binary features indicating
whether the goal state has been reached. In order to face reward non-linearity, we applied our scheme
using a neural network as reward approximator [37]. The network architecture is in Appendix F.
Results: The numerical results can be found in Figure 2, where we consider a Gridworld environ-
ment with a negative area in the middle and safe path along the side of the domain. In Figure 2b we
present the results when L = 0. Our expected improvements are confirmed by this toy problem.
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Figure 2: On the x-axis, we report different expert noises E , while the y-axis indicates the total
expected return for the policy that is recovered from the expert acting in ME,E
θ∗ , varying α. All the
recovered policies are evaluated on the learner MDP endowed with the true reward ML,L
θ∗ . The
expert baseline in the plots is the policy obtained in ML,L
θ∗ applying Value-Iteration. Since it is a
baseline independent from the IRL procedure, it is constant for all the different E . It represents the
best performance that can be achieved by a policy in ML,L
θ∗ . The fact that our algorithm produces
similar performance to this reference means that our method not only improves over MCE IRL
but also that it can be nearly optimal provided that α is properly tuned. We decided to adopt a
uniform T¯ in defining ME,E
θ∗ and M
L,L , and we tested all the possible pairs picking L from the
set {0.0, 0.05, 0.1} and E from {0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2}. Each plot reports the results for a fixed
L. The values used for α are reported in the legend.
Indeed, the MCE IRL performance 5 is seen to almost match the expert policy without mismatch, but
it becomes quickly less preferable as the expert noise E increases. On the other extreme, our method
with α = 0.8 is too conservative when E = 0, but it recovers the best performing policy when the
E = 0.2. The same experiment is repeated for L = 0.05 in Figure 2c and for L = 0.1 in Figure 2d.
Similar behavior is observed, but the MCE IRL performance decay starts at a much higher noise.
A similar trend is observed in Objectworld, as shown in Figures 2f, 2g, and 2h, and on other
Gridworlds reported in Appendix F. Consequently, the empirical experiments confirm that our
algorithm improves over the standard MCE IRL in case of model mismatch if α is such that TE,E
falls in the class T L,α. Overestimating the class’s necessary size worsens the performance.
6 Related Work
Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning (GAIL) [38] and its variants are IRL methods that use
a GAN-based reward to align the distribution of the state-action pairs between the expert and the
learner. When there is a transition dynamics mismatch, the expert’s actions are not quite useful for
imitation. [39, 40] have considered state only distribution matching when the expert actions are not
observable. Building on these works, [21, 22] have studied the imitation learning problem under
transition dynamics mismatch. These works propose some sophisticated model-alignment based
imitation learning algorithms in the high dimensional settings to address the dynamics mismatch.
5MCE IRL is indicated by the line labeled as α = 1 in Figure 2. Notice, indeed, that our method with α = 1
recovers the standard MCE IRL.
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7 Conclusions
In this work, we theoretically analyze the transition dynamics mismatch issue in IRL in the finite
MDP setting. We also propose a robust MCE IRL algorithm, and empirically demonstrate its efficacy.
As future work, we plan to extend our analysis and action-robustness approach to high dimensional
continuous control setting with appropriate practical relaxations.
Broader Impact
We address the transition dynamics mismatch issue in the inverse reinforcement with a theoretically
grounded algorithm and demonstrate its efficacy via extensive experiments. Our results apply to
the finite MDP setting. Once we extend our work to the high dimensional and continuous control
setting, it would be widely useful to the control/RL community. Nevertheless, we want to highlight
the importance of robustness in IRL, especially when it comes to topics related to safety, such as
autonomous driving and healthcare. Even though our adversarial training method improves robustness,
being overly conservative might result in lower performance. Thus one should carefully tune the
robustness related hyperparameters, which is α in our case.
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A Appendix structure
This Appendix provides additional proofs and experimental results. Here we provide an overview on
the organization of the section.
• Appendix B reports omitted facts of Section 2,
• Appendix C reports the proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3. In addition it presents the statement
and proof of Theorem 4 that is needed as intermediate step to prove Theorem 2.
• Appendix D gives additional insight on the gradient computation under model mismatch
recasting the causal entropy maximization as a worst case predictive log-loss minimization
problem.
• Appendix E provides support to Algorithm 2.
• Appendix F contains additional experimental results and details on their execution.
B Further Details of Section 2
Bellman Optimality Equations. An optimal policy pi∗Mθ is optimal for the MDP Mθ if pi ∈
arg maxpi′ V
pi′
Mθ
. This is equivalent to require that pi∗Mθ satisfies the following recursion known as
Bellman optimality equations for all state action pairs (s, a) ∈ S ×A:
pi∗Mθ (s) = arg max
a
Q∗Mθ (s, a)
Q∗Mθ (s, a) = Rθ(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
T (s′|s, a)V ∗Mθ (s′)
V ∗Mθ (s) = maxa Q
∗
Mθ
(s, a)
Soft Bellman Optimality Equations. The soft-optimal policy (always unique) in Mθ is defined as
pisoftMθ := arg maxpi′ V
pi′,soft
Mθ
. This is equivalent to require that pisoftMθ satisfies the following recursion
known as soft Bellman optimality equations for all state action pairs (s, a) ∈ S ×A:
pisoftMθ (a|s) = exp
(
QsoftMθ (s, a)− V softMθ (s)
)
QsoftMθ (s, a) = Rθ(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
T (s′|s, a)V softMθ (s′)
V softMθ (s) = log
∑
a
expQsoftMθ (s, a)
Value-Iteration. The Bellman optimality equations suggest that an optimal policy pi∗Mθ in Mθ can
be computed by finding the optimal value functions V ∗Mθ and Q
∗
Mθ
. In practice, when the transition
dynamics are known, they are computed by the algorithm known as Value-Iteration that iterates in
the following manner until the convergence criterion is not met.
Qk+1Mθ (s, a) = Rθ(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
T (s′|s, a)V kMθ (s′)
V kMθ (s) = maxa
QkMθ (s, a)
Soft-Value-Iteration. The soft Bellman optimality equations suggest that the soft-optimal policy
pisoftMθ in Mθ can be computed by finding the soft-optimal value functions V
soft
Mθ
and QsoftMθ . In practice,
when the transition dynamics are known, they are computed by the algorithm known as Soft-Value-
Iteration [31, 23] that iterates in the following manner until the convergence criterion is not met.
Qk+1Mθ (s, a) = Rθ(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
T (s′|s, a)V kMθ (s′)
V kMθ (s) = log
∑
a
expQkMθ (s, a)
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B.1 Matching One-hot Features vs. Matching State Occupancy Measures
In most MCE IRL literature, the matching objective is the expected feature count φ¯piM , defined as
φ¯
pi
M := E
pi,M
[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tφ(st)], where φ(s) is a state dependent vector.
Fact 1. If ∀s ∈ S, φ(s) ∈ R|S| is a one-hot vector with only the element in position s being 1, then
the expected feature count is proportional to the occupancy measure vector.
Indeed ∀M,pi, we have:
φ¯
piL
M = E
pi,M
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtφ(st)
]
= E
pi,M
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
∑
s∈S
φ(s)1 [s = st]
]
=
∑
s∈S
φ(s) E
pi,M
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt1 [s = st]
]
=
∑
s∈S
φ(s)
∞∑
t=0
γt E
pi,M
[1 [s = st]]
=
1
1− γ
∑
s∈S
ρpiM (s)φ(s)
For the one-hot feature map, ignoring the normalizing factor, the above sum of vectors can be written
as follows:
[ρpiM (s
′), ρpiM (s
′′), · · ·]> = ρpiM .
Leveraging on this fact, we formulate the MCE IRL problem (1)-(2) with occupancy measure ρ
match rather than the usual feature count match. Note that if the occupancy measure match is attained,
the match of any expected feature count is also attained.
C Proofs of Section 3
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Preliminaries. The soft-optimal policy of MEθ satisfies the soft Bellman optimality equations:
pisoftMEθ
(a|s) =
ZEa|s
ZEs
(14)
logZEs = log
∑
a
ZEa|s
logZEa|s = Rθ∗(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
TE(s′|a, s) logZEs′ (15)
Analogously, soft-optimal policy of MLθ :
pisoftMLθ
(a|s) =
ZLa|s
ZLs
(16)
logZLs = log
∑
a
ZLa|s
logZLa|s = Rθ∗(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
TL(s′|a, s) logZLs′ (17)
Another important point to clarify is that in the proof we overload the symbol ρpiM to account also for
the state-action occupancy measure, defined as follows:
ρpiM (s, a) := pi(a|s)ρpiM (s).
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Proof. We prove the result for the most general case of state-action dependent reward.
In the following we seek a bound for the total expected return difference,
∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣6.
∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ = 11− γ
∣∣∣∣∣∑
s,a
(
ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
(s, a)− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s, a)
)
Rθ∗(s, a)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
1− γ
∑
s,a
∣∣∣∣∣ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
(s, a)− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s, a)
∣∣∣∣∣ |Rθ∗(s, a)|
≤ R
abs
max
1− γ
∑
s,a
∣∣∣∣∣ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
(s, a)− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s, a)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
Rabsmax
1− γ
∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
(18)
Then, for two policies acting in the same MDP (ME in our case), it holds that (cf., [41, Lemma
A.1]): ∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
1− γ maxs DTV
(
pisoftML
θ∗
(·|s), pisoftME
θ∗
(·|s)
)
Moreover, upper bounding the right hand side by Pinsker’s inequality:∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
1− γ
√
2 max
s
DKL
(
pisoft
ML
θ∗
(·|s), pisoft
ME
θ∗
(·|s)
)
(19)
It rests to bound the following KL-divergence for any s:
DKL
(
pisoftML
θ∗
(·|s), pisoftME
θ∗
(·|s)
)
=
∑
a
pisoftML
θ∗
(a|s) log
pisoft
ML
θ∗
(a|s)
pisoft
ME
θ∗
(a|s)
=
∑
a
ZLa|s
ZLs
(
log
ZLa|s
ZEa|s
+ log
ZEs
ZLs
)
=
∑
a
ZLa|s
ZLs
log
ZLa|s
ZEa|s
+ log
ZEs
ZLs
(20)
By using the log-sum inequality on the term depending on the states only:
log
ZEs
ZLs
=
∑
a
ZEa|s
ZEs︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
log
ZEs
ZLs
=
∑
a
ZEa|s
ZEs
log
∑
a Z
E
a|s∑
a Z
L
a|s
≤ 1
ZEs
∑
a
ZEa|s log
ZEa|s
ZLa|s
(21)
6Notice that the bound in (18) holds also for the case of reward dependent on states
only. Indeed,
∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ = 11−γ
∣∣∣∣∣∑s
(
ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
(s)− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s)
)
Rθ∗(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
1
1−γ
∣∣∣∣∣∑s
(∑
a ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
(s, a)−∑a ρpisoftMEθ∗ME (s, a)
)
Rθ∗(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 11−γ
∣∣∣∣∣∑s,a
(
ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
(s, a)− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s, a)
)
Rθ∗(s)
∣∣∣∣∣.
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Consequently, replacing (21) in (20), and using the definitions (14) and (16), we have:
DKL
(
pisoftML
θ∗
(·|s), pisoftME
θ∗
(·|s)
)
≤
∑
a
(
ZLa|s
ZLs
−
ZEa|s
ZEs
)
log
ZLa|s
ZEa|s
=
∑
a
(
pisoftML
θ∗
(a|s)− pisoftME
θ∗
(a|s)
)
log
ZLa|s
ZEa|s
≤
∑
a
∣∣∣pisoftML
θ∗
(a|s)− pisoftME
θ∗
(a|s)
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a
∣∣∣pisoftML
θ∗
(a|s)− pisoftME
θ∗
(a|s)
∣∣∣max
a
∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∥∥∥pisoftML
θ∗
(a|s)− pisoftME
θ∗
(a|s)
∥∥∥
1
max
a
∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 max
a
∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣
Consequently:
max
s
DKL
(
pisoftML
θ∗
(·|s), pisoftME
θ∗
(·|s)
)
≤ 2 max
s,a
∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣ (22)
Hence, we can further upper bound the RHS of (19) by upper bounding the RHS of (22). To this end,
we exploit the following fact:
max
s,a
∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣ = max
{
log
ZLa¯|s¯
ZEa¯|s¯
, log
ZEa|s
ZLa|s
}
, (23)
where we adopted the following notation:
(s¯, a¯) = arg max
s,a
log
ZLa|s
ZEa|s
(24)
(s, a) = arg min
s,a
log
ZLa|s
ZEa|s
(25)
At this point, we can bound separately the two arguments of the max in (23). Starting from (24):
log
ZLa¯|s¯
ZEa¯|s¯
= logZLa¯|s¯ − logZEa¯|s¯
= Rθ∗(s¯, a¯)−Rθ∗(s¯, a¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+γ
{∑
s′
TL(s′|s¯, a¯) logZLs′ − TE(s′|s¯, a¯) logZEs′
}
= γ
{∑
s′
TL(s′|s¯, a¯) log Z
L
s′
ZEs′
+
(
TL(s′|s¯, a¯)− TE(s′|s¯, a¯)) logZEs′
}
≤ γ
{∑
s′
TL(s′|s¯, a¯)
(∑
a
pisoftML
θ∗
(a|s′) log
ZLa|s′
ZEa|s′
)
+
(
TL(s′|s¯, a¯)− TE(s′|s¯, a¯)) logZEs′
}
≤ γ log
ZLa¯|s¯
ZEa¯|s¯
+ γ
∑
s′
(
TL(s′|s¯, a¯)− TE(s′|s¯, a¯)) logZEs′
By rearranging the terms, we get:
log
ZLa¯|s¯
ZEa¯|s¯
≤ γ
1− γ
∑
s′
(
TL(s′|s¯, a¯)− TE(s′|s¯, a¯)) logZEs′
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≤ γ
1− γ
∑
s′
∣∣TL(s′|s¯, a¯)− TE(s′|s¯, a¯)∣∣ ∣∣logZEs′ ∣∣
≤ γ
1− γ maxs′
∣∣logZEs′ ∣∣∑
s′
∣∣TL(s′|s¯, a¯)− TE(s′|s¯, a¯)∣∣ (26)
Then, with analogous calculations for the second argument of the max operator in (23), we have
log
ZEa|s
ZLa|s
= logZEa|s − logZLa|s
= Rθ∗(s, a)−Rθ∗(s, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+γ
{∑
s′
TE(s′|s, a) logZEs′ − TL(s′|s, a) logZLs′
}
= γ
{∑
s′
TE(s′|s, a) log Z
E
s′
ZLs′
+
(
TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)) logZLs′
}
≤ γ log
ZEa|s
ZLa|s
+ γ
∑
s′
(
TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)) logZLs′
It follows that:
log
ZEa|s
ZLa|s
≤ γ
1− γ
∑
s′
(
TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)) logZLs′
≤ γ
1− γ
∑
s′
∣∣TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)∣∣ ∣∣logZLs′ ∣∣
≤ γ
1− γ maxs′
∣∣logZLs′ ∣∣∑
s′
∣∣TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)∣∣ (27)
We can plug in the bounds found in (27) and (26) in (23):
max
s,a
∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ1− γ max{maxs′ ∣∣logZEs′ ∣∣ ,maxs′ ∣∣logZLs′ ∣∣}maxs,a ∑
s′
∣∣TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)∣∣
(28)
It still remains to bound the term max
{
maxs′
∣∣logZEs′ ∣∣ ,maxs′ ∣∣logZLs′ ∣∣}. It can be done by a
splitting procedure similar to the one in (23). Indeed:
max
s′
∣∣logZEs′ ∣∣ = max
{
logZEs¯ , log
1
ZEs
}
(29)
where, changing the previous definitions of s¯ and s, we set:
s¯ = arg max
s
logZEs (30)
s = arg min
s
logZEs (31)
Starting from the first term in (29) and applying (15):
logZEs¯ = log
∑
a
ZEa|s¯
≤ log
(
|A|max
a
ZEa|s¯
)
= log |A|+ log max
a
ZEa|s¯
= log |A|+ max
a
logZEa|s¯ (32)
where the last equality follows from the fact that log is a monotonically increasing function. Further-
more, (30) implies that logZEs′ ≤ logZEs¯ ∀s′ ∈ S:
max
a
logZEa|s¯ ≤ maxa
(
Rθ∗(s¯, a) + γ logZ
E
s¯
∑
s′
T (s′|s¯, a)
)
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≤ Rmax + γ logZEs¯ (33)
In the last inequality we have used the quantity Rmax that satisfies Rθ∗(s, a) ≤ Rmax ∀(s, a) ∈
S × A. In a similar fashion, we will use Rmin such that Rθ∗(s, a) ≥ Rmin ∀(s, a) ∈ S × A.
Finally, plugging (33) into (32), we get:
logZEs¯ ≤
Rmax + log |A|
1− γ (34)
We can proceed bounding the second argument of the max operator in (29). To this scope, we observe
that
∑
a
1
|A| = 1 and then we apply the log-sum inequality as follows:
log
1
ZEs
=
∑
a
1
|A| log
∑
a
1
|A|∑
a Z
E
a|s
≤
∑
a
1
|A| log
1
|A|
ZEa|s
= log
1
|A| +
∑
a
1
|A| log
1
ZEa|s
≤ log 1|A| + maxa log
1
ZEa|s
(35)
Similarly to (33), we can apply one step of the soft Bellman equation to bound the term log 1
ZE
a|s
:
log
1
ZEa|s
= − logZEa|s
= −Rθ∗(s, a)− γ
∑
s′
TE(s′|s, a) logZEs′
= −Rθ∗(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
TE(s′|s, a) log 1
ZEs′
≤ −Rmin + γ log 1
ZEs
∑
s′
TE(s′|s, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
(36)
where in the last inequality we used (31), Rθ∗(s, a) ≥ Rmin ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A.
Since the upper bound in (36) does not depend on a:
max
a
log
1
ZEa|s
≤ −Rmin + γ log 1
ZEs
(37)
Replacing (37) into (35), we have:
log
1
ZEs
≤ log 1|A| −Rmin + γ log
1
ZEs
and consequently:
log
1
ZEs
≤ − log |A| −Rmin
1− γ (38)
Finally, using (34) and (38) in (29):
max
s′
∣∣logZEs′ ∣∣ ≤ 11− γ max {Rmax + log |A| ,− log |A| −Rmin} (39)
In addition, one can notice that the bound (39) holds also for maxs′
∣∣logZLs′ ∣∣:
max
s′
∣∣logZLs′ ∣∣ ≤ 11− γ max {Rmax + log |A| ,− log |A| −Rmin}
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So we can finally replace (39) in (28) that gives:
max
s,a
∣∣∣∣∣log Z
L
a|s
ZEa|s
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ(1− γ)2 max {Rmax + log |A| ,− log |A| −Rmin}maxs,a ∑
s′
∣∣TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)∣∣
(40)
We simplify the notation by introducing the constant C such that:
C : =
√
γmax {Rmax + log |A| ,− log |A| −Rmin}
We can now go back through the inequality chain to eventually state the bound in the Theorem. First,
plugging in (40) into (22) gives:
max
s
DKL
(
pisoftML
θ∗
(·|s), pisoftME
θ∗
(·|s)
)
≤ 2
(1− γ)2C
2 max
s,a
∑
s′
∣∣TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)∣∣ (41)
Then, using (41) in (19) we have:∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
1− γ
√
4
(1− γ)2C
2 max
s,a
∑
s′
|TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)| (42)
Finally, we arrive at the Theorem statement by replacing (42) in (18) and pulling the max operator
out from the square root (using the fact that square root is monotonically increasing):∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4CRabsmax(1− γ)3 maxs,a
√∑
s′
|TE(s′|s, a)− TL(s′|s, a)| (43)
C.2 Simulation Lemma for Occupancy Measures
Before moving to the proof of Theorem 2, we need a bound on the difference between the state
occupancy measures attained by the same policy in MDPs with different transition dynamics measured
in `1-distance. This result can be obtained by adapting the Simulation Lemma for total expected
return presented in [42] as expressed by the following Theorem.
Theorem 4. Consider MLθ∗ and M
E
θ∗ . Then any policy pi induces occupancy measures on the
environments MLθ∗ and M
E
θ∗ , respectively denoted as ρ
pi
ML and ρ
pi
ME that satisfy the following bound:
‖ρpiML − ρpiME‖1 ≤
γ
(1− γ) Es′∼ρpi
ML
,a′∼pi
[∥∥TL(·|s′, a′)− TE(·|s′, a′)∥∥
1
]
and consequently:
‖ρpiML − ρpiME‖1 ≤
γ
(1− γ) maxs′,a′
∥∥TL(·|s′, a′)− TE(·|s′, a′)∥∥
1
Proof. We prove the result for the norm of the difference of the state-action occupancy measures that
upper bounds the norm of the difference of the state only occupancy measures. Indeed:∑
s
|ρpiML(s)− ρpiME (s)| =
∑
s
∣∣∣∣∣∑
a
ρpiML(s, a)−
∑
a
ρpiME (s, a)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
s
∣∣∣∣∣∑
a
(ρpiML(s, a)− ρpiME (s, a))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
s
∑
a
|ρpiML(s, a)− ρpiME (s, a)|
First, notice that the occupancy measure ρpiM of a policy pi in an MDP M with transition dynamics T
is a stationary quantity. Consequently, for any state action pair the occupancy measure flux flowing
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into the state minus the occupancy measure flux from that state is equal to zero. In addition, when
a discounted problem is considered, the discount factor γ assumes the meaning of probability to
continue the episode with another step towards another state. Consequently, 1 − γ represents the
probability that the episode ends in the current state. Also this fact has to be taken into account in a
discounted task. It follows that:
P0(s)pi(a|s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
initial prob.
+ γ
∑
s′,a′
ρpiM (s
′, a′)T (s|s′, a′)pi(a|s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incoming flux
− γ
∑
s′,a′
ρpiM (s, a)T (s
′|s, a)pi(a′|s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outcoming flux
− ρpiM (s, a)(1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Termination probability
= 0
By normalization of probabilities in the second term:
P0(s)pi(a|s) + γ
∑
s′,a′
ρpiM (s
′, a′)T (s|s′, a′)pi(a|s)− γρpiM (s, a)− ρpiM (s, a)(1− γ) = 0
that implies:
ρpiM (s, a) = P0(s)pi(a|s) + γ
∑
s′,a′
ρpiM (s
′, a′)T (s|s′, a′)pi(a|s)
Notice the similarity to the Bellman equations.
Now, this result can be used to bound the difference between the occupancy measures induced by the
same policy into the different environments MLθ∗ and M
E
θ∗ . Indeed,
‖ρpiML − ρpiME‖1
= γ
∑
s,a
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s′,a′
ρpiML(s
′, a′)TL(s|s′, a′)pi(a|s)−
∑
s′,a′
ρpiME (s
′, a′)TE(s|s′, a′)pi(a|s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
= γ
∑
s,a
|pi(a|s)|
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s′,a′
ρpiML(s
′, a′)TL(s|s′, a′)−
∑
s′,a′
ρpiME (s
′, a′)TE(s|s′, a′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
a≤ γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s′,a′
ρpiML(s
′, a′)TL(·|s′, a′)−
∑
s′,a′
ρpiME (s
′, a′)TE(·|s′, a′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
b≤ γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s′,a′
ρpiML(s
′, a′)
(
TL(·|s′, a′)− TE(·|s′, a′))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
+ γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s′,a′
TE(·|s′, a′) (ρpiML(s′, a′)− ρpiME (s′, a′))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ γ
∑
s′,a′
∑
s
∣∣ρpiML(s′, a′) (TL(s|s′, a′)− TE(s|s′, a′))∣∣+ γ∑
s′,a′
∑
s
∣∣TE(s|s′, a′) (ρpiML(s′, a′)− ρpiME (s′, a′))∣∣
= γ
∑
s′,a′
ρpiML(s
′, a′)
∥∥TL(·|s′, a′)− TE(·|s′, a′)∥∥
1
+ γ
∑
s′,a′
|ρpiML(s′, a′)− ρpiME (s′, a′)|
∑
s
TE(s|s′, a′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= γ E
s′,a′∼ρpi
ML
[∥∥TL(·|s′, a′)− TE(·|s′, a′)∥∥
1
]
+ γ ‖ρpiML − ρpiME‖1
where in inequality a we used pi(a|s) ≤ 1, and in b we add and subtract inside the sum
ρpiML(s
′, a′)TE(·|s′, a′) and then we use triangular inequality. The result presented in Theorem 4 is
obtained bringing on the LHS the second term of the latest expression:
‖ρpiML − ρpiME‖1 ≤
γ
(1− γ) Es′,a′∼ρpi
ML
[∥∥TL(·|s′, a′)− TE(·|s′, a′)∥∥
1
]
C.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. In this proof, the occupancy measures are state only occupancy measures. Thanks to (18)
applied in the case of rewards depending solely on the states, we can state that:∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θ
ML
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Rabsmax1− γ
∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ
ML
− ρ
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
∥∥∥∥∥
1
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Then using triangular inequality on the RHS we can write:∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ
ML
− ρ
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ
ML
− ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ML
∥∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ML
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ME
θ∗
ME
− ρ
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
∥∥∥∥∥
1
However, the first term vanishes because the policy pisoft
MLθ
is the solution to the optimization problem
(1)-(2) when when we use ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ML
as ρ in (2). Analogously, the policy pisoft
MLθE
is the solution to the
optimization problem (1)-(2) when when we use ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
as ρ in (2). Hence, the third term is also
zero. Canceling the vanishing terms, we obtain:∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θ
ML
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Rabsmax1− γ
∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ML
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
Then, adding and subtracting ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
and taking again advantange of triangular inequality in the RHS
we have: ∣∣∣∣∣V pi
soft
ML
θ
ML
θ∗
− V
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
θ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Rabsmax1− γ
[∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ML
− ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥∥ρpi
soft
ML
θ∗
ME
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
∥∥∥∥∥
1
]
Finally, bounding the second term with the bound in Theorem 1 and the first one with the Simulation
Lemma 4 yields the result.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 3
C.4.1 Impossibility to match the State-action Occupancy Measure
Before proving the theorem, we show that finding the policy pi∗(a|s) whose state-action occupancy
measure matches the state-action visitation frequency ρ of the expert 7 is impossible in case of model
mismatch. Consider:
ρ(s, a) = ρpi
∗
ML(s, a)
ρ(s)piE(a|s) = ρpi∗ML(s)pi∗(a|s)
pi∗(a|s) = piE(a|s) ρ(s)
ρpi
∗
ML
(s)
Notice that the policy pi∗ does not sum to one, when there is model mismatch, i.e., the feasible set
of (1)- (2) would be empty if state-action occupancy measures were used in posing the constraint (2).
In addition, even if the two environments were the same, only the expert policy would have been in
the feasible set because there exists an injective mapping from state-action visitation frequencies to
policies as already noted in [31, 43].
C.4.2 Theorem Proof
Proof. If there exists a policy pi∗ that matches the expert occupancy measure ρ(s) in the environment
MLθ , the Bellman flow constraints [43] leads to the following equation for each state s ∈ S:
ρ(s)− P0(s) = γ
∑
s′,a′
ρ(s′)pi∗(a′|s′)TL(s|s′, a′) (44)
This can be seen by writing the Bellman flow constraints for the expert policy piE with transition
dynamics TE , and for the policy pi∗ with transition dynamics TL:
ρ(s)− P0(s) = γ
∑
s′,a′
ρ(s′)piE(a′|s′)TE(s|s′, a′) (45)
7In this proof the expert policy is denoted by piE . In the specific case of our paper it stands for either pisoft
ML
θ
or
pisoft
ME
θ
. However, the result holds for every valid expert policy.
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ρpi
∗
ML(s)− P0(s) = γ
∑
s′,a′
ρpi
∗
ML(s
′)pi∗(a′|s′)TL(s|s′, a′) (46)
By definition of pi∗, the two occupancy measures are equal, so we can equate the LHS of (45) to the
RHS of (46), obtaining:
ρ(s)− P0(s) = γ
∑
s′,a′
ρpi
∗
ML(s
′)pi∗(a′|s′)TL(s|s′, a′)
Finally, replacing ρ in the RHS, one obtains the equation in (44). In addition, for each state we have
the condition on the normalization of the policy:
1 =
∑
a
pi∗(a|s), ∀s ∈ S
All these conditions can be seen as an underdetermined system with 2 |S| equations (|S| for normal-
ization, and |S| for the Bellman flow constraints). The unknown is the policy pi∗ represented by the
|S| |A| entries of the vector pi∗.
We introduce the matrix T . In the first |S| rows, the entry in the sth row and (s′ |A|+ a′)th column
is the element ρ(s′)TL(s|s′, a′). In the last |S| rows, the entries are instead given by 1 from position
s′ |A| to position s′ |A|+ |A|. These rows of the matrix serves to impose the normalization condition
for each possible state.
We can thus write the underdetermined system as:[
ρ− P 0
1|S|
]
= Tpi∗, (47)
where the left hand side is a vector whose first |S| positions are the element-wise difference between
the state occupancy measure and the initial probability distribution for each state, and the second half
are all ones. The right hand side is instead written using the matrix T , and the optimal policy vector
pi∗, that are more precisely described in (48) and (49) respectively.
If we look at the dimensions we notice that in the left hand side we have 2 |S| conditions, so the rank
of the matrix T has to be at least 2 |S| to guarantee that the system admits infinitely many solutions
for pi∗. Considering that T has 2 |S| rows, its rank is at most 2 |S|. Consequently, we need to require
full-rank for T . This fact limits the class of perturbation in the dynamics that can be considered still
achieving perfect matching. In the following two paragraphs, we provide a more visual description of
the quantities appearing in the right hand side of the system (47).
Block Representation of the Matrix T . We can define, for each state s ∈ S , the probability flows
matrix F (s) ∈ R|S|×|A| as follows:
F (s) =

ρ(s)TL(s1|s, a1) ρ(s)TL(s1|s, a2) . . . ρ(s)TL(s1|s, a|A|)
ρ(s)TL(s2|s, a1) ρ(s)TL(s2|s, a2) . . . ρ(s)TL(s2|s, a|A|)
...
...
. . .
...
ρ(s)TL(s|S||s, a1) ρ(s)TL(s|S||s, a2) . . . ρ(s)TL(s|S||s, a|A|)

Then, we define the unitary row matrix B(s) ∈ R|S|×|A| to be zero everywhere, but in row s that
contains only ones. It has a number of columns equal to the cardinality of the action space A. For
example, when |A| = 4 and |S| = 6, the unitary row matrix for the state s3 is:
B(s3) =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

Then, we can represent the matrix T ∈ R2|S|×|S||A| by stacking unitaries and probability flows
matrices in the following fashion:
T =
[
F (s1) F (s2) . . . F (s|S|)
B(s1) B(s2) . . . B(s|S|)
]
(48)
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Block Representation of the Optimal Policy Vector pi∗. For each state s ∈ S, we can define a
local optimal policy vector pi∗(s) ∈ R|A| as:
pi∗(s) =

pi(a1|s)
pi(a2|s)
...
pi(a|A||s)

Then, the optimal policy vector pi∗ ∈ R|S||A| is given by the vertical stacking of the local optimal
vectors:
pi∗ =

pi∗(s1)
pi∗(s2)
...
pi∗(s|S|)
 (49)
D Deriving Gradient-based Method from Worst-case Predictive Log-loss
We consider again in this section the optimization problem given in (1)-(2) with model mismatch,
i.e., using ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
as ρ. The aim of this section is to give an alternative point of view on this program
based on a proper adaptation of the worst-case predictive log-loss [23, Corollary 6.3] to the model
mismatch case.
[23] proved that the maximum causal entropy policy satisfying the optimization constraints is also
the distribution that minimizes the worst-case predictive log-loss. However, the proof leverages on
the fact that learner and expert MDPs coincide, an assumption that fails in the scenario of our work.
This section extends the result to the general case, where expert and learner MDP do not coincide,
thanks to the two following contributions: (i) we show that the MCE constrained maximization given
in (4)-(5) in the main text can be recast as a worst-case predictive log-loss constrained minimization
and (ii) that this alternative problem leads to the same reward weights update found in the main text
for the dual of the program (4)-(5). We start reporting again the optimization problem of interest:
arg max
pi∈Π
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pi(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pi,ML
]
(50)
subject to ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
= ρpiML (51)
An alternative interpretation of the entropy is given by the following property:
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pi(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pi,ML
]
= inf
p¯i
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log p¯i(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pi,ML
]
, ∀pi
Thus, it holds also for pisoft
MLθE
solution of the primal optimization problem (50)- (51), that exists if
Theorem 3 is satisfied. In addition, to maintain the equivalence with the program (50)-(51), we
restrict the inf search space to the feasible set of (50)-(51) that we denote Π˜.
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pisoftMLθE (at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pisoftMLθE ,ML
]
= inf
p¯i∈Π˜
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log p¯i(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pisoftMLθE ,ML
]
Notice that since pisoft
MLθE
is solution of the maximization problem, we can indicate the the previous
equality as:
sup
p˜i∈Π˜
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log p˜i(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ p˜i,ML
]
= inf
p¯i∈Π˜
sup
p˜i∈Π˜
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log p¯i(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ p˜i,ML
]
(52)
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It is thus natural to interpret the quantity:
c(pi) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pi(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pisoftMLθE ,ML
]
(53)
as the cost function associated to the policy pi because, according to (52), this quantity is equivalent
to the worst-case predictive log-loss among the policies of the feasible set Π˜. It can be seen that the
loss inherits the feasible set of the original MCE maximization problem as search space for the inf
and sup operations. It follows that in case of model mismatch, the loss studied in [23, Corollary 6.3]
is modified because a different set must be used as search space for the inf and sup.
In the following, we develop a gradient based method to minimize this cost and, thus, the worst case
predictive log-loss. 8
Furthermore, we can already consider that pi belongs to the family of soft Bellman policies
parametrized by the parameter θ in the environment MLθ because they are the family of distri-
butions attaining maximum discounted causal entropy (cf., [31, Lemma 3]). The cost is, in this case,
expressed for the parameter θ:
c(θ) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
−γt log pisoftMLθ (at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pisoftMLθE ,ML
]
(54)
Theorem 5. If pisoft
MLθE
exists, the gradient of the cost function given in (54) is equal to:
∇θc(θ) =
∑
s
(
ρ
pisoft
ML
θ
ML
(s)− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s)
)
∇θRθ(s)
In addition, this result generalizes when the expectation in the cost function is taken with respect to
any of the policies in the feasible set of the primal problem (50)-(51).
Note that choosing one-hot features, we have∇θc(θ) = ρ
pisoft
ML
θ
ML
− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
as used in Section 4.
Uniqueness of the Solution. The cost in equation (54) is strictly convex in the soft max policy
pisoft
MLθ
because − log(·) is a strictly convex function and the cost consists in a linear composition of
these strictly convex functions. Thus the gradient descent converges to a unique soft optimal policy.
In addition, the fact that for each possible θ, the quantity log pisoft
MLθ
= QsoftMθ (s, a)−V softMθ (s) is convex
in θ since the soft value functions (QsoftMθ (s, a) and V
soft
Mθ
(s)) are given by a sum of rewards that
are linear in θ and LogSumExp funtions that are convex. It follows that log pisoft
MLθ
is a composition
of linear and convex functions for each state actions pairs. Consequently the cost given in (54) is
convex in θ. It follows that alternating an update of the parameter θ using a gradient descent scheme
based on the gradient given by Theorem 5 with a derivation of the corresponding soft-optimal policy
by Soft-Value-Iteration, one can converge to θE whose corresponding soft optimal policy is pisoftMLθE
.
However, considering that the function LogSumExp is convex but not strictly convex there is no
unique θE corresponding to the soft optimal policy pisoftMLθE
.
D.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We will make use of the following quantities:
• P
pisoft
ML
θ
t (s) defined as the probability of visiting state s at time t by the policy pi
soft
MLθ
acting in
MLθ
8If we used ρ
pisoft
ML
θ∗
ML
as ρ, we would have obtained the cost c(pi) = E
[∑∞
t=0−γt log pi(at|st)
∣∣∣∣ pisoftML
θ∗
,ML
]
.
In this case, the gradient is known see [44].
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• P
pisoft
ML
θ
t (s, a) defined as the probability of visiting state s and taking action a from state s at
time t by the policy pisoft
MLθ
acting in MLθ
• P
pisoft
ML
θE
t (s) defined as the probability of visiting state s at time t by the policy pi
soft
MLθE
acting
in MLθ
• P
pisoft
ML
θE
t (s, a) defined as the probability of visiting state s and taking action a from state s at
time t by the policy pisoft
MLθE
acting in MLθ
The cost can be rewritten as:
c(θ) = −
∞∑
t=0
γt
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
P
pisoft
ML
θE
t (s, a) log pi
soft
MLθ
(a|s)
= −
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
P
pisoft
ML
θE
0 (s, a)
(
QsoftMLθ
(s, a)− V softMLθ (s)
)
−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s, a)γ
(
QsoftMLθ
(s, a)− V softMLθ (s)
)
−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
P
pisoft
ML
θE
2 (s, a)γ
2
(
QsoftMLθ
(s, a)− V softMLθ (s)
)
−
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
P
pisoft
ML
θE
3 (s, a)γ
3
(
QsoftMLθ
(s, a)− V softMLθ (s)
)
. . .
=
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)V softMLθ (s) (55)
−
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)QsoftMLθ (s, a) + γ
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)V softMLθ (s) (56)
− γ
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)QsoftMLθ (s, a) + γ
2
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
2 (s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)V softMLθ (s) (57)
− γ2
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
2 (s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)QsoftMLθ (s, a) + γ
3
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
3 (s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)V softMLθ (s)
. . .
The gradient of the term in (55) has already been derived in [44] and it is given by:
∇θ
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)V softMLθ (s) = ∇θ
∑
s
P0(s)V
soft
MLθ
(s) =
∑
s,a
ρ
pisoft
ML
θ
ML
(s, a)∇θRθ(s, a)
Now, we compute the gradient of the following terms starting from (56). We notice that this term can
be simplified as follows:
−
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)QsoftMLθ (s, a) + γ
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)V softMLθ (s)
= −
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)
(
Rθ(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
TL(s′|s, a)V softMLθ (s
′)
)
+ γ
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)V softMLθ (s)
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= −
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)Rθ(s, a)− γ
∑
s′
∑
s,a
TL(s′|s, a)P0(s)pisoftMLθE (a|s)V
soft
MLθ
(s′) + γ
∑
s
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s)V
soft
MLθ
(s)
= −
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)Rθ(s, a)− γ
∑
s′
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s
′)V softMLθ (s
′) + γ
∑
s
P
pisoft
ML
θE
1 (s)V
soft
MLθ
(s)
= −
∑
s,a
P0(s)pi
soft
MLθE
(a|s)Rθ(s, a)
With similar steps, all the terms except the first one are given by
−
∞∑
t=0
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
t (s, a)γ
tRθ(s, a) = −
∑
s,a
ρ
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
(s, a)Rθ(s, a)
If the reward is state only, then and we can marginalize the sum over the action and then exploiting
the fact that pisoft
MLθE
is in the feasible set of the primal problem (50)-(51):
−
∞∑
t=0
∑
s,a
P
pisoft
ML
θE
t (s, a)γ
tRθ(s) = −
∑
s
ρ
pisoft
ML
θE
ML
(s)Rθ(s) = −
∑
s
ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s)Rθ(s)
It follows that the gradient of all the terms but the first term (55) is given by:
−
∑
s
ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s)Rθ(s)
Finally, the proof is concluded by summing the latest result to the gradient of (55) that gives:
∇θc(θ) =
∑
s
(
ρ
pisoft
ML
θ
ML
(s)− ρ
pisoft
ME
θ∗
ME
(s)
)
∇θRθ(s)
It can be noticed that the computation of this gradient exploits only the fact that pisoft
MLθE
is in the primal
feasible set and not the fact that it maximizes the discounted causal entropy. It follows that all the
policies in the primal feasible set share this gradient. This means that this gradients aim to move
the learner policy towards the primal feasible set while the causal entropy is then maximized by
Soft-Value-Iteration.
E Further Details of Section 4
Here, we prove that the optimization problem in (10) can be solved by the Algorithm 2. First of all,
one can rewrite (10) as:
E
s∼P0
[
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
{
Rθ(st) +H
pipl (A | S = st)
} ∣∣∣∣ pipl, piop,M two,L,α, s0 = s
]]
The quantity inside the expectation over P0 is usually known as free energy, and for each state s ∈ S ,
it is equal to:
F (pipl, piop, s) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
{
Rθ(st) +H
pipl (A | S = st)
} ∣∣∣∣ pipl, piop,M two,L,α, s0 = s
]
Separating the first term of the sum over temporal steps, one can observe a recursive relation that is
useful for the development of the algorithm:
F (pipl, piop, s)
= Rθ(s) +H
pipl(A|S = s)
25
+ E
apl∼pipl,aop∼piop
[
E
s′∼T two,L,α(·|s,apl,aop)
[
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
γt
{
Rθ(st) +H
pipl (A | S = st)
} ∣∣∣∣ pipl, piop,M two,L,α, s1 = s′
]]]
= Rθ(s) +H
pipl(A|S = s)
+ γ E
apl∼pipl,aop∼piop
[
E
s′∼T two,L,α(·|s,apl,aop)
[
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
{
Rθ(st) +H
pipl (A | S = st)
} ∣∣∣∣ pipl, piop,M two,L,α, s0 = s′
]]]
= Rθ(s) +H
pipl(A|S = s) + γ E
apl∼pipl,aop∼piop
[
E
s′∼T two,L,α(·|s,apl,aop)
[
F (pipl, piop, s′)
]]
= E
apl∼pipl,aop∼piop
[
Rθ(s)− log pipl(apl|s) + γ E
s′∼T two,L,α(·|s,apl,aop)
[
F (pipl, piop, s′)
]]
Then, our aim is to find the saddle point:
V (s) = max
pipl
min
piop
F (pipl, piop, s)
and the policies attaining it. Define the joint quality function for a triplet (s, apl, aop) as:
Q(s, apl, aop) = Rθ(s) + γ E
s′∼T (·|s,apl,aop)
[V (s′)]
In a dynamic programming context, the previous equation gives the quality function based on the
observed reward and the current estimate of the saddle point V . This is done by step (11) in the
Algorithm 2. It remains now to motivate the update of the saddle point estimate V in (12). Consider:
max
pipl
min
piop
F (pipl, piop, s)
= max
pipl
min
piop
E
apl∼pipl(·|s),aop∼piop(·|s)
[
Q(s, apl, aop)− log pipl(apl|s)]
= max
pipl
min
piop
E
apl∼pipl(·|s)
[
E
aop∼piop(·|s)
[
Q(s, apl, aop)− log pipl(apl|s)|apl]]
= max
pipl
E
apl∼pipl(·|s)
[
min
piop
E
aop∼piop(·|s)
[
Q(s, apl, aop)− log pipl(apl|s)|apl]]
= max
pipl
E
apl∼pipl(·|s)
minaop Q(s, apl, aop)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qpl(s,apl)
− log pipl(apl|s)

= log
∑
apl
expQpl(s, apl),
where the second last equality follows choosing a greedy policy piop that selects the opponent action
that minimizes the joint quality function Q(s, apl, aop).
The last equality is more involved and it is explained in the following lines:
E
apl∼pipl(·|s)
[
Qpl(s, apl)− log pipl(apl|s)] = ∑
apl
pipl(apl|s) (Qpl(s, apl)− log pipl(apl|s))
The latter expression is a strictly concave with respect to each decision variable pi(a|s). So if the
derivative with respect to each decision variable pipl(apl|s) is zero, we have found the desired global
maximum. The normalization is imposed once the maximum has been found. Taking the derivative
for a particular decision variable, and equating to zero, we have:(
Qpl(s, apl)− log pipl(apl|s))− 1 = 0
It follows that:
pipl(a|s) ∝ expQpl(s, apl)
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and imposing the proper normalization, we obtain the maximizing policy pipl,∗ with the form:
pipl,∗(apl|s) = expQ
pl(s, apl)∑
apl expQ
pl(s, apl)
Finally, computing the expectation with respect to the maximizing policy:
E
apl∼pipl,∗(·|s)
[
Qpl(s, apl)− log pipl(apl|s)]
=
∑
apl
pipl,∗(apl|s) (Qpl(s, apl)− log pipl,∗(apl|s))
=
∑
apl
expQpl(s, apl)∑
apl expQ
pl(s, apl)
(
Qpl(s, apl)− log expQ
pl(s, apl)∑
apl expQ
pl(s, apl)
)
=
∑
apl
expQpl(s, apl)∑
apl expQ
pl(s, apl)
(
Qpl(s, apl)−Qpl(s, apl) + log
∑
apl
expQpl(s, apl)
)
=
∑
apl
expQpl(s, apl)∑
apl expQ
pl(s, apl)
(
log
∑
apl
expQpl(s, apl)
)
= log
∑
apl
expQpl(s, apl) (58)
Basically, we have shown that the optimization problem is solved when the player follows a soft-
max policy with respect to the quality function Qpl(apl|s) = minaop Q(s, apl, aop). This explains
the steps for the player policy in Algorithm 2. In addition, replacing the definition Qpl(apl|s) =
minaop Q(s, a
pl, aop) in (58), one gets the saddle point update (12) in Algorithm 2.
We still need to proceed similarly to motivate the opponent policy derivation from the quality function
(2). To this end, we maximize with respect to the player before minimizing for the opponent, we
have:
min
piop
max
pipl
F (pipl, piop, s)
= min
piop
max
pipl
E
apl∼pipl(·|s),aop∼piop(·|s)
[
Q(s, apl, aop)− log pipl(apl|s)]
= min
piop
max
pipl
E
aop∼piop(·|s)
[
E
apl∼pipl(·|s)
[
Q(s, apl, aop)− log pipl(apl|s)|aop]]
= min
piop
E
aop∼piop(·|s)
[
max
pipl
E
apl∼pipl(·|s)
[
Q(s, apl, aop)− log pipl(apl|s)|aop]]
The innermost maximization is solved again by observing that it is a concave function in the decision
variables, normalizing one obtains the maximizer policy, and plugging that in the expectation gives
the soft-max function with respect to the player action apl. We define this function as the quality
function of the opponent, because it is the amount of information that can be used by the opponent to
decide its move.
Qop(s, aop) = log
∑
apl
expQ(s, apl, aop)
It remains to face the external minimization with respect to the opponent policy. This is trivial, the
opponent can simply act greedly since it is not regularized :
min
piop
E
aop∼piop(·|s)
[Qop(s, aop)] = min
aop
Qop(s, aop)
This second part clarifies the updates relative to the opponent in Algorithm 2.
Notice that the algorithm iterates in order to obtain a more and more precise estimate of the joint
quality function Q(s, apl, aop). When it converges, the quality functions for the player and the
agent respectively are obtained, thanks to the transformations illustrated here and in the body of
Algorithm 2.
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F Additional Experimental Results
Additional Gridworlds. The trade-off determined by the parameter α, described in the main paper,
is observed for other Gridworlds whose rewards are again linear combinations of the one-hot features
associated to each state. The results are reported in Figure 3.
Shifted Plots. When L 6= 0, it may be also insightful to report the policy performances as
function of the noise difference E − L, i.e., because this quantity is proportional to the term
maxs,a
∥∥TL,L (· | s, a)− TE,E (· | s, a)∥∥
1
9. These plots are reported in Figure 5.
A Simple Exception. The trade-off is not visible in the simplest possible environment where the
aim is to find the terminal state. In this situation, the opponent cannot induce detrimental behavior for
the agent because all the possible state has the same reward. The opponent cannot lead the agent to a
state where it receives a low reward. The results are reported in the first line of Figure 3 as a function
of E and in Figure 5 as a function of the noise difference E − L.
Uncertainty Quantification. In all the plots, the curves’ uncertainty is due to the stochasticity of
the recovered policies. We quantified the uncertainty as follows: We compute the average reward of
|S| trajectories such that they all start from a different starting point. Then, we store this average,
and we repeat the previous point for another group of |S| trajectories. We repeated this process for
1000 groups of |S| trajectories, and we report the uncertainty as the standard deviation of the 1000
averages obtained from each one of the trajectories group.
Low Dimensional Features. In Figure 6, we investigate the effect of our algorithms on a reward
described only by three features. In particular, the feature vector associated with a state s is of length
3, and each entry can be either 1 or 0. The first entry is equal to 1 if, in that state, there is the danger
of type 1, equal to 0 otherwise. Analogously, the second equals 1 to indicate the danger of type 2,
whereas the last feature equals 1 for non-terminal states. The true reward is obtained by taking the
inner product of the feature vector of each state, and the true reward weights w = [−1,−5,−1].
Here, w indicates that the danger of type 1 leads to a penalty of −1; the danger of type 2 leads to a
severe penalty of −5, and finally, each cell that is not terminal leads to a navigation cost of −1. The
results in this specific environment suggest that our method improves MCE IRL more significantly in
the low-dimensional feature case.
Fixed Starting State. Finally, we also confirmed our findings fixing the starting point to be in the
furthest possible position of the goal. It can be seen as one of the most challenging starting points
since all the grid has to be safely crossed. For this task, we reduced the Adam learning rate to 0.15.
Hyperparameters and Tolerances for Linear Reward Problems. In the settings whose reward
is linear in the provided features, we adopted the tolerances described in Table 2 and Adam hyperpa-
rameters reported in Table 1.
Objectworld: Neural Network Architecture. The Objectworld non-linear reward has been ap-
proximated by a two 2D convolutional layers neural network with the ReLu activation function. The
size of both hidden layers is equal to the number of input features constructed, as explained in the
main text. The network weights are optimized using Adam with the hyperparameters reported in
Table 3.
Finite Horizon Objectworld. ObjectWorld is an environment initially introduced as a finite hori-
zon problem [36]. At the same time, in the main text, we modified it to an infinite horizon problem
to apply our algorithm directly. Here we modify our algorithm and benchmark it in a finite horizon
Objectworld. In agreement with [36], the positions within three cells to an outer blue object are
9Indeed, maxs,a
∥∥TL,L (· | s, a)− TE,E (· | s, a)∥∥
1
= |L − E |maxs,a
∥∥T ref(·|s, a)− T¯ (·|s, a)∥∥
1
.
Then, considering that in our experimental setting T ref is deterministic and T¯ is uniform,
we have: maxs,a
∥∥T ref(·|s, a)− T¯ (·|s, a)∥∥
1
= 2
(
1− 1|S|
)
. Hence, the following holds:
maxs,a
∥∥TL,L (· | s, a)− TE,E (· | s, a)∥∥
1
= 2
(
1− 1|S|
)
|L − E |.
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assigned a reward equal to −1, but if they are also within two cells from an outer green object, the
reward is +1. All other positions are assigned a null reward, so the presence of objects with other
colors is not relevant in determining the reward function. In the finite horizon setting, we evaluate a
policy’s performance via the reward accumulated along a trajectory of length 2N , where N is the
Objectworld side dimension. Hence, the optimal policy attempts to the areas with positive rewards
and stays there until the end of the maximum trajectory length. It is thus essential to add the "stay"
action to the action space of the agent.
In order to adapt our algorithm to the finite horizon setting, we used Algorithm 3 from [37] (instead of
the infinite horizon policy propagation proposed in [31, Section V.C]) to compute the state visitation
frequency at a fixed horizon. A proof of concept of our algorithm on a 10 × 10 Objectworld is
given in Figure 7. The neural network used to approximate the reward function consists of two 2D
convolutional layers with the ReLu activation function. The size of both hidden layers is equal to
the number of input features constructed as originally proposed in [36]. We adopted Adam [35] as
an optimizer with hyperparameters in Table 4. Finally, as done in [36], we consider the optimal
policy as the expert rather than the soft-optimal one. As far as the features available to the learner are
considered, we adopted the discrete features proposed in the previous work using this benchmark.
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Table 1: Reward optimizer hyperparameters
Hyperparameter Value
IRL Optimizer Adam
Learning rate 0.5
Weight decay 0.0
First moment exponential decay rate 0.9
Second moment exponential decay rate 0.99
Numerical stabilizer 1e− 7
Number of steps 200
Table 2: MDP solver parameters
Parameter Value
2 Player soft value iteration tolerance 1e− 10
Soft value iteration tolerance 1e− 10
Value iteration tolerance 1e− 10
Policy propagation tolerance 1e− 10
Table 3: Infinite horizon Objectworld reward optimizer hyperparameters
Hyperparameter Value
IRL Optimizer Adam
Learning rate 1e− 3
Weight decay 0.01
First moment exponential decay rate 0.9
Second moment exponential decay rate 0.999
Numerical stabilizer 1e− 8
Number of steps 200
Table 4: Finite horizon Objectworld reward optimizer hyperparameters
Hyperparameter Value
IRL Optimizer Adam
Learning rate 1e− 3
Weight decay 0.05
First moment exponential decay rate 0.9
Second moment exponential decay rate 0.999
Numerical stabilizer 1e− 8
Number of steps 200
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GridWorlds: Performance as a function of Expert Noise
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Figure 3: On the x-axis, we report different expert noises E , while the y-axis indicates the total
expected return for the policy that is recovered from the expert acting in ME,E
θ∗ varying α. All the
recovered policies are evaluated on the learner MDP endowed with the true reward ML,L
θ∗ . The
expert baseline in the plots is the policy obtained in ML,L
θ∗ applying Value-Iteration. We decided
to adopt a uniform T¯ in defining ME,E
θ∗ and M
L,L , and we tested all the possible pairs picking
L from the set {0.0, 0.05, 0.1} and E from {0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2}. Each row of the Figure
reports starting from left to right the environment reward and then the results for a learner noise L
respectively equal to 0.0, 0.05, and 0.1.
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Fixed Starting State at the bottom right cell: Learner Noise = 0
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Figure 4: This Figure reports, instead, the total expected return obtained fixing the starting state on
the corner opposite to the goal corner. The label Type refers to the corresponding environments of
Figures 3 and 5. The trade-off determined by α is particularly evident for environment Type 2, Type
3, and Type 4, while again Type 0 is an exception.
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GridWorlds: Performance as a function of Noise Difference
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Figure 5: The Figure above shows the same results already presented in Figure 3 but shifting the
x-axis in order to represent similar behavior of the curves as a function of the noise difference E−L.
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Low Dimensional Features
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Figure 6: The Figure reports the results of our algorithm in the case of Low Dimensional Features. In
particular, in the first line, 6a shows the reward map of the environment, 6b, 6c, and 6d the results
expressed as a function of the expert noise E on the x-axis while 6e, 6f, and 6g show the same results
as a function of the noise difference E − L.
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Finite Horizon ObjectWorld
(a) Environment
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Expert Noise
13
14
15
16
17
To
ta
l R
et
ur
n 1.0
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
expert
(b) Learner Noise = 0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Expert Noise
8
10
12
14
16
To
ta
l R
et
ur
n 
(c) Learner Noise = 0.05
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Expert Noise
11
12
13
14
15
16
To
ta
l R
et
ur
n 
(d) Learner Noise = 0.1
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Noise Difference
13
14
15
16
17
To
ta
l R
et
ur
n 1.0
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
expert
(e) Learner Noise = 0
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Noise Difference
13
14
15
16
To
ta
l R
et
ur
n 
(f) Learner Noise = 0.05
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Noise Difference
11
12
13
14
15
16
To
ta
l R
et
ur
n 
(g) Learner Noise = 0.1
Figure 7: The Figure reports the results of our algorithm in the case of Finite Horizon ObjectWorld.
In particular, in the first line, 7a shows the reward map of the environment, 7b, 7c, and 7d the results
expressed as a function of the expert noise E on the x-axis while 7e, 7f, and 7g show the same results
as a function of the noise difference E − L.
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